

U.S., Russia Cut Spy Satellites

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and the Soviet Union both cut back slightly last year on the number of spy satellites lofted over each other's territory, according to well-informed U.S. military space experts.

But the Russians, officials say, continue to launch more than three times as many of these camera-equipped satellites than the Americans.

During 1970, 29 Soviet reconnaissance satellites, each remaining in orbit for an average of 8 to 13 days, photographed American ICBM and submarine bases, airfields and ABM sites.

The Russian total last year was the same as in 1968, but was three fewer than were launched in 1969.

The United States, on the other hand, orbited only nine photographic snoopers last year, three less than in 1969 and seven less than 1968.

Although the Pentagon's satellites, in general, stay in orbit longer than their Soviet counterparts, Defense Department officials admit "we are spending less time over the USSR than they are over us."

Using average times in orbit, one official estimates that

during the past year, the Russians had at least one spy-in-the-sky satellite overhead on 290 days compared with about 180 days for the United States.

Officials say this does not represent any gamble with U.S. intelligence needs at this time, but they also stress that they don't want to cut back this type of activity any further. The ability of both the Soviets and Americans to monitor each other's ICBM and ABM programs from space is viewed as vital if the two superpowers are to reach agreement on limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

Officials also are reluctant to draw any conclusions about the slight slowdown in the pace of Russian space-borne spying.

Some say it may be the result of fewer international trouble spots that needed monitoring last year. Others attribute it to a new, longer-lasting satellite, able to carry more film, which the Soviets began flying in 1968.

Prior to that time, most Russian picture-taking spacecraft swept over the United States four to six times a day and were recovered after an 8-day flight. The new breed can stay up 12 to 13 days.

The Pentagon, at the moment, employs two types of satellites for space-monitoring purposes.

One kind, using a Thor-Agena booster rocket, makes broad sweeps over the Soviet Union land mass, usually at altitudes above 100 miles. If something of unusual interest is spotted, another type of satellite, with very high resolution cameras, is launched aboard a Titan III-B booster.

Last year, according to the experts, the Air Force flew three of the Thor-Agena missions.

Six of the Titan III-B super-spy missions, which generally last less than a week, were also flown last year. Four of these came between late June and late October—a time in which there was intense U.S. interest in what was happen-

ing along the Suez Canal and at Russian ICBM bases, where a slowdown in construction was spotted and eventually announced by the Pentagon.

Some additional light was shed yesterday on the quiet space race between the two countries in a report issued for congressional use by one of the government's top civilian space experts, Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II of the Library of Congress.

Sheldon's report shows that the Russians put 57 satellites into orbit last year with specialized military missions as opposed to 16 for the Defense Department.

The 1970 totals show a steady drop for the United States from 33 launches in 1964, and a steady rise in Russian military space activity from a 1964 level of only 16.

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Work on Six SS-9 Silos Is Halted by Russians

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has halted construction on six more underground silos for its huge SS-9 ICBM, well informed U.S. officials report.

The stop in construction work was spotted recently by Air Force photo reconnaissance satellites orbiting over the Russian landmass and is now being reflected in the latest U.S. intelligence estimates, these sources say.

Work was still underway at these sites as recently as three months ago.

The new information comes at a time when the Nixon administration is debating the stance it will take when the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the Russians resumes in Vienna on March 15.

This most recent intelligence estimate is the second one within the past two months which reflects apparent continuing cutbacks by the Russians in the SS-9 build-up which got under way in 1964 and continued, with occasional pauses, through mid-1970.

As recently as last Oct. 9, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird publicly credited the Kremlin with "more than 300 SS-9s" including those already deployed plus others for which underground silos were still being prepared.

Slowdown Confirmed

In December, however, the Pentagon confirmed press reports that a slowdown had been spotted in Russian SS-9 activity.

Informed government sources at that time said privately that work had stopped at 12 of 18 new silos started last spring, bringing the total under 300 to 294. No new sites have been started since then.

Now, officials say that work has also stopped at another six sites, bringing the total down to 288 missiles, 276 of them now judged as ready to fire.

The SS-9, which can carry three five-megaton nuclear warheads, has been painted by the Pentagon in recent years as the biggest threat to survival of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs.

Defense officials have said frequently that with a force of 420 of these mammoth missiles, each equipped with three warheads, the Russians could wipe out 95 per cent of

the 1,000-missile Minuteman force in a surprise attack.

Main Argument

The SS-9 has also provided the principal argument for building the Safeguard ABM network to protect Minuteman. And, it is the single most important Russian weapon that American negotiators at the now recessed arms talks have been trying to put a specific numbers limitation on.

The latest intelligence information is likely to increase a debate already going on within the Nixon administration on how and if to respond to the Soviet SS-9 moves.

Officials remain cautious of Soviet motives. Some suggest that the SS-9 developments may merely be a pause while the Russians install triple warheads on the missiles.

Others believe the Russians, who have never mentioned the SS-9 cutbacks in discussions at SALT, may be signaling to this country that it is indeed interested in moving toward some agreement.

There is a widespread feeling, however, that by not mentioning the reductions at SALT and letting the U.S. discover it on its own, the Soviets may be attempting to bring

pressure on the White House to accept a tacit limitation on nuclear arms, without an official agreement, something the administration opposes and feels would be dangerous.

Pressure Increased

Pentagon confirmation of the earlier SS-9 slowdown has already brought increased congressional pressure on the President to make a similar gesture by slowing down or halting work on Safeguard.

The administration is considering such a slowdown, though the President's final position on Safeguard for the coming year is still said to be undecided. Fewer SS-9s, Defense officials admit, reduces somewhat the urgency of the ABM system.

Nevertheless, informed officials report that the administration remains convinced that Safeguard is the best bargaining chip the U. S. has at SALT and wants to keep the program moving, but perhaps at a slower pace.

Officials from several government agencies say there is little doubt that the Russians are more interested in getting the U.S. to halt Safeguard than any other weapon.

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The Problem of MIRV: I

By HERBERT SCOVILLE

WASHINGTON—In developing national security policy it is always necessary to estimate the capabilities and intentions of potential hostile nations and then evaluate the risks to national security from alternate decisions on force levels.

This weighing of risks is too often neglected in arms limitation agreements. Frequently the risk from possible violation of the agreement is determined without consideration of the dangers if an unrestrained arms race went on.

A classic example of this situation exists regarding MIRVs or Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. MIRVs present a very serious risk to national security because of their potential as counterforce weapons, particularly because of the incentive that they might provide for carrying out a first strike.

The major potential strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union is the deployment of MIRVs on its large SS-9 missile. Secretary Laird has said that such a threat would be unacceptable when the Soviets have 420 SS-9s each with three MIRVs (the number of multiple re-entry vehicles tested on the SS-9 so far), or a total of about 1,300 warheads. He has recently reported "some preliminary indications that the Soviet Union may have recently started slowing somewhat the level of activity associated with SS-9 missile construction." Therefore, since they now have less than 300 built, they may never deploy as many as 420. However, even a smaller number of SS-9s would provide an equivalent threat if each missile had more than three accurate MIRVs. There is no technological reason why the Soviet SS-9 MIRV system might not include 10 or more warheads.

Because of this larger payload capacity of the Soviet SS-9 missile,

We Must Control This Weapon to Avert A New Arms Spiral

MIRVs present in the long run a greater security risk to the U.S. than they do to the Soviet Union. The U.S. is now ahead in MIRV technology. Only in November did Defense spokesmen announce that the Soviets may have tested for the first time a MIRV system for their SS-9. It will be more than a year or two before the Soviets could have a reliably tested accurate system which could, when deployed, threaten the Minuteman.

The MIRV problem is quite different for the Soviet Union. Instead of a long-term risk, the current U.S. MIRV deployment provides a more immediate threat to Soviet security. The U.S. has attempted to make clear that the present Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles do not have a first-strike counterforce potential and that the U.S. has unilaterally decided not to attempt to acquire such a capability. However, such statements as the Sept. 22 remarks by General Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, that the "Minuteman III with MIRVs will be our best means of destroying time urgent targets like the long range weapons of the enemy" are not likely to reassure the Soviets.

Therefore, the Russians should have a strong interest in an early halt to the deployment of Poseidon and Minuteman even though in the long term MIRVs might provide them with a military advantage.

U.S. verification of a ban on Soviet MIRV deployment by "national" means, i.e., those under U.S. control and not requiring agreed inspection within the Soviet Union, is not possible. External observation of the missile will not tell

whether it contains one, three, ten or twenty warheads. Instead, it is reported that the Administration has proposed "onsite" inspections of the deployed missiles. Unfortunately, even this cannot be expected to provide more than illusory confidence that MIRVs are not deployed. The best "onsite" technique would involve a simple "screwdriver" to open the reentry vehicle to see whether more than one warhead were present. X-ray or other similar scientific methods might be substituted, but such inspection would involve the disclosure of what, at the present time, even the U.S. would consider sensitive security information. Admiral Rickover is not likely to look with favor on the Soviet inspection of U.S. nuclear submarines which he considers superior to the Russian ones.

However, even such intrusive inspection would not by itself provide proof that MIRVs were not being deployed. A few hours' advance notice of an inspection would be too long, for it would be a relatively simple matter to substitute, before the inspector's arrival, a single warhead for the MIRV stage of an appropriately designed missile. Even more difficult than for land-based ICBMs would be the verification for non-deployment of MIRVs on submarine missiles. No further analysis is needed to demonstrate that onsite inspection is not a practical or negotiable method of providing confidence that U.S. security is being protected under a MIRV deployment ban.

Does this mean a MIRV limitation is not feasible? No, other means of controlling MIRVs are possible. This analysis of MIRVs will be continued in my second article tomorrow.

This is the first of two articles by Herbert Scoville, former Deputy Director of the C.I.A. and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and author with Robert Osborn of "Missile Madness."

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U.S. Now Seeks New ABM To Supplement Safeguard

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 8—The Defense Department has decided to step up development of a cheaper system for defending the launching sites of intercontinental Minuteman missiles, according to Pentagon sources.

The need for such a system, weapons specialists say, is based on the impression that Soviet Union can develop additional warheads for each SS-9 intercontinental missiles more cheaply than United States can respond by adding Safeguard defensive missiles.

Funds for the program, which is called the hard-site defense, are being almost tripled, officials say, rising from \$25-million in the current defense budget to about \$65-million in next years budget, which went to Congress last week.

The army is scheduled to have been selected to supervise the development effort, which is expected to employ modified versions of the Spring missiles developed for the Safeguard system.

U. S. Miscalculation Seen

Some analysts go so far as to suggest that the United States miscalculated Soviet technological capacity in its proposal last year for a mutual limit on offensive and defensive missiles that would allow the Russians to keep 250 to 300 SS-9 missiles.

The Americans wanted to limit defensive missiles to the protection of Moscow and Washington, while calling for the freezing of the numbers of offensive missiles.

A special limitation for the SS-9 was based on the premise that with three warheads on each missile, the Russians still would not be able to have any assurance of knocking out most of the 1,000 Minuteman missiles. The United States, by this

offer, was prepared to forego Safeguard defense of the Minuteman.

Congress has already authorized construction of Safeguard defenses around Minuteman complexes in Montana, North Dakota, Missouri and Wyoming.

But now the Americans believe the Russians could readily develop six-warhead clusters for each SS-9, posing a threat to the Minuteman.

Some officials in the Pentagon and State Department therefore favor making a modified proposal when the talks on limitation of strategic arms resume in Vienne on March 15. Under this proposal, the Soviet Union would be permitted to expand its 64 defensive missile sites around Moscow to 100 or 128 sites, and the United States to supplement its Safeguard defenses around four Minuteman complexes with the new hard-site missiles. The United States might also for go its right to build 250 to 300 giant missiles to match the SS-9.

Such a proposal, advocates say, would allow the Soviet Union to complete its Moscow defenses, particularly effective against a potential threat from China or other small nuclear powers.

It would give the United States greater confidence in its ability to have its Minutemen survive a surprise attack, thus increasing the stability of the strategic balance.

In a counter to the initial United States proposal, the Russians, last fall at Helsinki, proposed an agreement on 100-missile defenses of Moscow and Washington only. American officials have insisted that any agreement must embrace offensive as well as defensive missiles.

The Russians are now believed to have tested three-part multiple, independently targetable warheads on their SS-9's; they are not believed to have tested six-warhead clusters, but the technology is believed within their grasp.

Some officials point out that if a broad arms control agreement proves elusive, the United States would want to be able to bolster the Minuteman defenses against expanding numbers of Soviet warheads.

But in such an arms race, the Safeguard would reach a point where it was too expensive, some officials say. Thus the effort to develop a less costly hard-site system to augment Safeguard.

The Problem of MIRV: II

By HERBERT SCOVILLE

WASHINGTON—The control of MIRV's, which would provide such great security and economic benefits for both the United States and the Soviet Union, can be achieved by imposing a ban on MIRV testing and production as well as deployment.

Fortunately, adequate verification of a ban on MIRV testing is easier than one on deployment since it can be achieved by "national" means alone. Some tests leading toward development of MIRV—Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles—capability could be carried out by the Soviet Union under the guise of other weapons development or even a space program. However, any MIRV system that is not flight-tested at essentially full range could never be deployed with confidence that it had high reliability and accuracy.

The United States has been able to observe Soviet ICBM firings ever since the program was initiated in 1957 and it would undoubtedly be able to observe multiple warheads were these tested at full range. Test firings of the SS-9 with MIRV's in space without re-entry or with only a single warhead re-entering the atmosphere would not provide the Russians with a system that they could deploy with confidence.

In the case of submarine missiles, the verification might be a little less certain. However, even in this case, the chance of detecting a multiple re-entry vehicle firing would be good.

A ban on production of MIRV's would be extremely difficult for the United States to verify since the MIRV stage of the missile could be manufactured in relatively small facilities. It would be necessary to have a right to carry out large numbers of onsite inspections. Such inspection would almost certainly be unacceptable to the Soviets; probably also to United States industry.



Robert Osborn

Thus, only in the testing phase would the United States be able to verify an agreement limiting MIRV's. Fortunately, the Soviets have only just begun MIRV testing and would require a year or more before a deployable system could be available. Therefore, the United States could protect its security under a comprehensive ban on MIRV production, testing and deployment through verification of the testing phase. It could be confident that as long as the Soviets had not extensively tested their MIRV's, they would not carry out any widespread production or deployment. The risks to United States security would be extremely low—certainly less than if the Soviets were allowed to develop freely an optimal MIRV system for their SS-9.

The risks to the security of either the United States or the Soviet Union would be much greater from an unrestrained MIRV race than from a ban on the production, testing and deployment of such weapons.

Why then do both countries appear so reluctant to negotiate seriously such a ban? Despite repeated urgings from the Congress, the Administration has refused to halt its MIRV testing and deployment programs even though a Soviet ABM that would require their existence could not be operational for many years and even though the halt

were made contingent on similar Soviet restraint in the MIRV and ABM areas. In place of such a bilateral limitation, the Government has opted for a unilateral United States ban on MIRV accuracy improvements which is not likely to reassure any Soviet planner.

There seems to have been little or no serious discussion of MIRV's at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks by either side, and the United States appears to be seeking onsite inspection to verify a deployment ban, a move probably considered by the Soviets as a signal of lack of serious United States interest.

Why has the Soviet Union not raised the issue of MIRV's earlier on at the strategic arms talks? While it is understandable that they do not wish to be frozen in a position of inferiority, it is quite likely that had serious negotiations been undertaken at an earlier stage, United States MIRV deployment might have been forestalled. An early MIRV ban would have been clearly in their interest. Unfortunately, the Russian leaders seem reluctant to make a proposal that would be controversial to some segments of their society without some assurance that it would be accepted by the United States.

New weapons development programs seem to possess momentum to outstrip the plodding pace of arms control negotiations. Is this not the time for the United States to provide the necessary leadership to obtain limitations on MIRV's before it is really too late? If the Soviets are really slowing their SS-9 deployment and have already begun testing MIRV's, the United States should use this new situation as a trigger to re-examine its policies. The risks from an unlimited MIRV race far outweigh those from possible violations of a MIRV ban.

Herbert Scoville is former Deputy Director of the CIA and of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This is the second of two articles.

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China to Launch Second Satellite

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Red China is getting ready to launch another space satellite, informed officials said yesterday.

The event—expected soon—is bound to resurrect military arguments that the Chinese must be taken seriously as a threat to the United States.

The contrary opinion is that China launching scientific satellites into space rather than military missiles into a test range should be comforting.

The basis for predicting a new launch in the near future is feverish activity at China's spaceport at Shuang-ch'eng, about 30 miles south of the Chinese city of Haerhpín and 300 miles south of the Soviet border. There is always a chance the mission could be scrubbed for technical difficulties, but officials report no evidence of this yet.

Shuang Ch'eng is the same spot from which China launched her first space satellite on April 24, 1970—the one that broadcast the revolutionary song, "The East Is Red," as it whirled around the earth.

American space specialists, when asked the import of a second Chinese launch, said it would be further proof of steady scientific progress—internal political turmoil or not.

On the last shot, there was debate on whether the Chinese used a sophisticated medium-range ballistic missile with an upper stage to put its 380.6-pound satellite into orbit or an inefficient intercontinental ballistic missile.

Back then, Dr. John S. Foster, Pentagon research chief, said the Chinese launch "is

the beginning of a continuing, rather large, intense space program with important military values involving very large boosters."

Red China's missile program has run behind previous Pentagon predictions. Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara—in defending on Sept. 18, 1967, the construction of the Sentinel missile defense—said "indications are" that the Chinese "will have medium-range ballistic missiles within a year or so, an initial intercontinental ballistic missile capability in the early 1970s, and a modest force in the mid-70s."

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Communist China Orbits 2d Satellite

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 3—Communist China orbited its second earth satellite today, the Pentagon announced.

The satellite, of undisclosed size, was launched from the Shwangchengtze space facility in northwest China at 7:15 A.M. Eastern standard time and was quickly monitored by the global satellite and detection system of the North American Air Defense Command.

The launching was interpreted by defense officials here as further confirmation that Communist China is moving toward development of an intercontinental ballistic missile, or

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I.C.B.M., carrying a thermonuclear warhead.

By coincidence the flight of the rocket was observed by a Navy pilot returning to the carrier Kitty Hawk after a mission over Southeast Asia.

The pilot, according to the Pentagon announcement, reported seeing "a bright plume well to his north and at a high altitude." What he saw was apparently the upper stage of the launching rocket as it fired to place the satellite into orbit.

The first Chinese satellite—a 381-pound package that broadcast a song, "The East Is Red," in honor of Chairman Mao Tse-tung was launched nearly a year ago, on April 24, 1970.

In his State of the World Message last week, President Nixon said, "China continues to work on strategic ballistic missiles and, by the late 1970's, can be expected to have operational I.C.B.M.'s capable of reaching the United States."

It remains unclear to American officials, however, whether for its satellite launching China is using the booster—or first stage—of its medium-range ballistic missile or is testing the booster stage of an intercontinental missile.

Speculation on Capability

The general presumption among American analysts is that it is using an improved version of its medium-range ballistic missile—a rocket with a 1,000-mile range that it has started to deploy.

The rocket used for the satellite launching, according to United States defense officials,

might be capable of delivering a small payload on the United States but not the three-megaton thermonuclear warhead that China apparently is developing for an ICBM.

China conducted its 11th atomic test last Oct. 14, when a three-megaton thermonuclear device—the equivalent of three million tons of TNT—was exploded in the atmosphere.

The launching today came as no surprise to United States officials. Through various satellite and electronic monitoring methods, they have been aware for some weeks of major activity at the Shwangchengtze base, which is in the Gobi desert 400 miles northwest of the industrial city of Lanchow.

The North American Air Defense Command reported that the Chinese satellite was orbiting the earth once every 106 minutes with an apogee, or high point, of 1,800 kilometers and a perigee, or low point, of 269 kilometers.

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Reds Held Testing 'Hunter' Satellites

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Flight paths of two recently launched Soviet satellites indicate a new test of a system to knock out unfriendly space vehicles.

The two Russian satellites, designated Cosmos 394 and 397, also may have been sent up from a different spaceport than the two previous shots, one in 1968 and the other in 1970.

Space specialists theorized yesterday that the Soviet Union used the military complex at Plesetsk rather than the more civilian spaceport of Tyuratam.

If further analysis substantiates that theory, the change of spaceports probably means that the Soviet Union considers its satellite inspection system in the operational rather than experimental category.

Part of the basis for suspecting a different launching site is the change in the inclination of the Soviet spacecraft this time as they crossed the Equator.

Cosmos 394—launched Feb. 9—crossed at an inclination of 65.9 degrees and Cosmos 397—launched Feb. 25—crossed at 65.8 degrees. This compares with an inclination of about 62 degrees for previous satellite inspection lasts from Tyuratam.

The Soviet Union in all three series of shots used "target" and "hunter" satellites. The radar track showed the hunters passing close enough to the target satellites to blow them up—apparently testing the ability to knock out another nation's observation or navigation satellites.

In this new shot, Cosmos 394 flew a nearly circular orbit about 370 miles above the earth. The hunter—Cosmos 397—flew an elliptical course, zooming up as high as 1,390 miles and down as low as 368 miles.

In the two earlier experiments—the first beginning on Oct. 19, 1968, and the second on Oct. 20, 1970—three satel-

lites were used, two of them hunters. It appears that only two were used in this latest test.

American radars in those two earlier marksmanship exercises detected debris from explosions in the hunters, with space specialists unsure whether the target satellite shot the hunters or vice-versa.

Although the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department study such Soviet shots intensively, very little information is released to the public. But a recent Library of Congress report commented on the satellite inspection nature of the 1968 and 1970 tests.

"Two successive flights made a reasonably close intercept of a predecessor," wrote Charles S. Sheldon II in the Library of Congress report of Jan. 12, "and then moving away a bit were in turn exploded into many pieces of debris."

"In the absence of Soviet announcements," Sheldon continued, "an assessment cannot be conclusive. But the suspicion remains that a capability to inspect and destroy satellites had been created."

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Pentagon Aide, Reporting Big New Soviet Missile

Silos, Warns of Research Gap

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 18 —

United States intelligence officials say they have recently detected large new missile silos in the Soviet Union. The silos, they add, could be part of an intercontinental ballistic missile system that "could make major United States weapon systems obsolete in the late nineteen-seventies."

The development was disclosed to the Senate Armed Services Committee today by Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, as part of a plea for an increase in funds for military research and development — from \$7.1-billion in the cur-

rent year to \$7.88-billion in fiscal 1972.

The Soviet Union, he said, is spending the equivalent of \$3-billion, or 10 per cent, more annually on military research than the United States.

"Starting about 1971 we could reasonably expect several technological surprises from the Soviet Union in the form of unexpected prototype military systems," he added.

The Pentagon has said that the Soviet silos — holes in the ground from which missiles are launched were observed by military satellite, but it has maintained that it does not yet know what is to be placed in them.

Dr. Foster's point was that this was the situation the Unit-

ed States had to expect as long as the gap between United States and Soviet spending on research and development continued to grow.

'Enormous Expenditures'

"We must come to grips with the fact," he said, "that our major rival, because he is already outdoing us by about 40 to 50 per cent in equivalent effort, is capable of undertaking perhaps several major programs over and above what we are at present undertaking."

Once the Soviet Union pulls ahead technologically, sometime about 1975, he contended, "recovery would not be feasible without enormous expenditures over many years—and without grave risk, meanwhile, of losing our national margin of safety."

Dr. Foster's exposition of the Soviet technological threat was the most explicit that has come from the Pentagon in an official statement.

Among Dr. Foster's other reports on Soviet research were the following:

¶Surface ships and submarines are equipped with sea-skimming cruise missiles with ranges of several hundred miles. The United States is just beginning to develop them.

¶There are growing numbers of quieter nuclear submarines that are hard to detect.

¶"Formidable new techniques of air defense deployments" have been exhibited in Egypt.

¶The Russians lead in the development of heavy-lift helicopters.

¶New fighter aircraft are emerging.

One reason for Soviet research success, Dr. Foster said, is a growing number of researchers. The United States had 142,000 graduates in engineering and the natural sciences in 1970, he said, while the Soviet Union had 247,000. He anticipated that in 1976 the United States would have 181,000 and the Soviet Union 359,000.

Improved Missile Set-Up

The research director, explaining what the United States is doing to meet the Soviet challenge, said the Minuteman anti-ballistic missile system was being strengthened to improve its chances of surviving nuclear attack.

Other development plans, he said, include an undersea long range missile system that would be fired from an improved submarine, improved communications by satellite and under water, a new under-water mine, high-speed hydrofoil and air-cushion missile-attack ships, assault ships, aircraft carriers, an antitank missile for the infantryman and less vulnerable helicopters.

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Laird Cautions Hill On Soviet Missiles

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird acknowledged yesterday that the Soviets have slowed the pace of their missile-building, but cautioned Congress that the reasons are still unclear and that it is necessary to move ahead with the Safeguard ABM system in the meantime.

The Defense chief also revealed that Red China may have made its first test of an ICBM over a reduced range inside mainland China late last year.

One explanation for the Soviet slowdown, Laird said, "may be that the Soviets are preparing to deploy new ICBM systems."

Speculation that the Soviets are already building new missiles even larger than their huge SS-9 ICBMs was raised publicly last Sunday by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.)

The Pentagon confirmed that some new ICBM silo construction had been spotted but said it was not sure what the Soviets are doing.

In presenting his defense

posture statement to Congress yesterday, Laird had nothing more to say about the new development which, if pursued by the Kremlin, would most probably have a large impact on both the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which reopen on Monday, and on U.S. defense planning.

The administration's ABM proposal put forth by Laird would cost \$1.3 billion next year and would continue work already under way at two Minuteman bases in North Dakota and Montana where Safeguard missiles are to provide a protective shield for U.S. ICBMs. Work would also start at Whiteman AFB, Mo., the third of four ABM sites approved last year by Congress.

The big change this year, however, is an administration request to Congress for authority to switch the fourth site from another Minuteman base at Warren AFB, Wyo., to Washington, D.C.

The final decision would be made later in the year by President Nixon after the SALT talks resume and it becomes more clear whether an agreement can be reached with the Kremlin that might limit ABMs to Moscow and Washington, along with limitations on offensive weapons.

If no agreement were reached, the ABM at Warren would move ahead, protecting additional Minuteman silos plus the nearby headquarters of the Strategic Air Command and North American Air Defense Command.

Laird took a generally moderate tone in describing the Pentagon's reaction to the Soviet strategic threat.

"We are pursuing moderate programs, preserving our flexibility with regard to both SALT and the threat and keeping our options open for the future," he said.

Besides a request to Congress for a limited expansion in the Safeguard ABM, Laird said only one other project aimed at countering the Soviet missiles—a billion-dollar plan to strengthen Minuteman ICBM silos to withstand enemy warhead blasts — would go into production in the coming fiscal year.

Laird proposed that development of a new U.S. bomber and a missile-carrying submarine to match any renewed Soviet buildup be accelerated.

Laird said that until the United States can get the Soviets to put a leash on the type of missiles that threaten to wipe out America's retaliatory force in a surprise attack the Safeguard program "must proceed in an orderly and timely manner." To do more

than what the Pentagon proposed this year, he said, "would reduce the chance for success in SALT: to do less could erode our security and reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously."

The Defense Secretary did not propose as he did last year that work begin on expanding Safeguard to a full 12-site system that would protect the population against a Chinese attack or accidental ICBM launching, but he did make it clear that the larger network is still warranted and that the United States and the Soviet Union, even under a SALT agreement, may want additional defenses against China.

Laird's essentially hold-the-line policy for the ABM reflects what could turn out to be a similar policy in Moscow.

The Soviets are now credited with some 1,440 ICBMs. By mid-1971, Laird said, this total could go "over 1,500," but only "if they elect to continue work on those sites where construction has slowed or stopped."

In 1969, Laird had estimated that if the Soviets kept up their deployment rates then, some 2,500 ICBMs might be on launchers by the mid-1970s.

This year, Laird says there is no agreed-upon estimate of where things will stand beyond 1972.

Laird said there had been "unexplained slowdowns" on all three front-line Russian missiles, the big SS-9 and the smaller, Minuteman-sized SS-11 and SS-13s.

The SS-11 force has "leveled off," he said, with "over 900 missiles." About 276 of them are operational SS-9s, about 200 older missiles and the rest SS-13s.

The Soviet missile firing-submarine fleet keeps expanding, however, with a force matching the expected 41-boat U.S. Polaris fleet expected by 1974. Seventeen Soviet subs are already operating.

The Soviet heavy bomber force continues "its slow downward trend" from about 145 planes, said Laird, although a new swing-wing bomber under development "is estimated to have intercontinental range."

Defense officials classify the new plane as a medium bomber and say its ability to attack the United States rests on the number of times it can refuel in the air en route.

Despite the Chinese missile test last year, Laird estimated that the earliest the Chinese could begin fielding ICBMs would be 1973, but that 1975 might be more likely and that it would probably be late in the decade before they had them in quantity.

But China's ability to make more trouble for the Soviets may be closer at hand. The defense chief estimated that the Chinese are putting more emphasis on building intermediate range (1,500-mile) missiles plus producing their own versions of the Soviet TU-16 medium jet bomber.

Preoccupation with the Soviet border dispute may also limit the Chinese from anything more than nibbling around the edges elsewhere in Asia. "While the Chinese have the largest land Army in the world (2.5 million men)," Laird said, "a commitment of forces in conventional military operations on more than one front would impose serious burdens" on their supply abilities "and is considered unlikely today . . ."

APM

Soviet Missile Site Pattern Called Hint of New System

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 26—United States officials said today that the pattern of recent construction of intercontinental missile sites in the Soviet Union might presage the deployment of a new Soviet offensive-weapon system.

United States observation of new construction by the Russians, first detected last December, has shown about 20 holes large enough to accommodate the Soviet SS-9, the largest intercontinental ballistic missile in existence, or even bigger weapons, these officials said.

New information available to the United States has also shown that the recently dug holes are distributed in five clusters along the wide arc forming the Soviet offensive missile system. This stretches from the Polish border to the Chinese frontier.

This extensive deployment pattern is increasingly suggesting to United States specialists that the Soviet Union may indeed be building a new weapons system. This might be related to improved SS-9's, or still newer missiles, equipped with accurate MIRV's, or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

The White House is understood to be proceeding on the assumption that the new con-

struction is related to Soviet development of the multiple-warhead MIRV's.

An explanation of the new construction was requested last week by American representatives at the talks in Vienna on limiting strategic arms. The Soviet delegation has not replied, officials here said.

As detailed information from satellite observation has been obtained in recent weeks, the Nixon Administration was reported to be chiefly concerned with the long-range potential of new Soviet missile deployment rather than with the present size of missile stockpiles.

Since it takes about 18

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months from the start of construction until a missile site is operational, the White House is believed to be thinking of the nuclear parity problem that will exist by the middle of 1972—with the assumption that the Soviet multiple-warhead will then have become operational.

United States intelligence officials are aware that the Soviet Union is testing MIRV warheads, but do not know how

When the talks resumed March 15, after a three-month recess, the United States was awaiting an answer to its inquiries about the meaning of the cessation of work on three of six new SS-9 sites.

Officials said today that construction of these three silos remained halted and they speculated that the sites might have been abandoned in favor of a new system connected to the approximately 20 new holes observed in recent months. The new holes, officials said, are in locations different from those of the three silos on which work was stopped.

Signal Suspected

After American intelligence agencies spotted the halt in the installation of the three silos — information indicated that some of them might have been dismantled — the Nixon Administration publicly wondered whether this was a signal that the Soviet Union might be amenable to a slowdown in the deployment of offensive weapons.

In his State of the World Message on Feb. 25, President Nixon expressed hope for a slowdown. The United States position in the talks to limit arms is that an agreement with the Soviet Union must cover both offensive and defensive weapons and not only defensive ones, as proposed by Moscow.

The first public disclosure of the new Soviet construction was made on March 7 by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, in a television appearance. It was confirmed the same day by the Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, who said that "it is correct that we have detected some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union" but that

"we are not sure exactly what it is or what the Soviets' intentions are."

Since then, however, additional observation by satellite has provided the United States with more detailed information on the number of the new holes and their deployment pattern.

This knowledge, officials said, has increasingly inclined the Administration to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union may be working on a new weapons system.

They added that such a new system might indicate installation of missiles even larger than the SS-9, conversion of the SS-9 from liquid to solid fuel or an altogether new generation of weapons.

The conversion of the SS-9

to solid fuel, which would be a major technological achievement, would give the missile a propellant that could be instantly ignited. The use of liquid fuel forces some missiles to be maintained in constant readiness, a costly and dangerous procedure.

Solid fuel also provides greater thrust per unit of weight of propellant.

Officials here also reported that no meaningful progress had been achieved in the Vienna talks in the last 10 days.

They said that while the Soviet delegation had indicated its willingness in principle to discuss an agreement on defensive and offensive nuclear weapons, it still insisted that an accord be reached first on defensive systems.

ABM

MIRV'S IN SOVIET BELIEVED IN PLACE

**U.S. Aides See Indications
Missiles May Be Getting
Multiple Warheads**

By **WILLIAM BEECHER**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 22 — Intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Union may have begun to put multiple warheads on some of its missiles and that it is rapidly expanding the construction of new, larger silos to house the missiles, according to high Administration sources.

Officials say that there is reason to believe that the 25-megaton warheads on some of the SS-9 intercontinental missiles are being replaced by three five-megaton warheads, each of which can be sent to a different target. A megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT.

The sources also disclosed that at least 40 silos, somewhat larger than those for the SS-9 were being constructed at more than half a dozen sites in the Soviet Union. No missiles have been installed in the new silos and analysts were uncertain whether they were destined to house an improved version of the SS-9 or a new intercontinental missile.

These reports are said to be behind the warning by Defense Secretary Milvin R. Laird in New York yesterday that the United States may be moving toward a "second-rate strategic position." They are also said to have prompted Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, to caution in a Boston speech today that the "over-all

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strategic balance may be tilting in favor of Moscow."

Speaking to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Laird for the first time raised the possibility of a supplementary budget request in the fiscal year starting in July if the Soviet buildup in strategic weapons continued and an agreement on arms control remained elusive.

He expressed concern over recent intelligence reports that the Soviet Union "is involved in a new—and apparently extensive — ICBM construction program." He regretted the public's fixation on Vietnam and the current unpopularity of the military, Congressional budget pressures and the inflation that, he said, was pushing up military costs.

"Now the time has come," he declared, "for the American people to think about America's role in promoting peace and security after Vietnam."

40 Silos Reported Spotted

And Senator Jackson, who last month reported that the Soviet Union was building missile silos of a new size and design, told the World Affairs Council of Boston today: "Subsequent to our national detection of this disturbing development, we have now learned that Soviet construction of this system is moving ahead at a rapid pace."

As a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Jackson is normally kept informed by intelligence officers on strategic developments, a Pentagon spokesman noted today.

Administration sources say that satellite photos early this year showed a total of about a dozen new, larger silos under construction at three different missile sites.

A restudy of previous photos, together with more recent coverage, they say, shows roughly 40 silos at more than six different missile sites. Senator Jackson today suggested that the Russians were capable of deploying "at least 60 to 70 of

these huge new missiles this year."

The Soviet normally deploys its different kinds of missiles in separate complexes. The fact that the new silos are being dug alongside both large SS-9 and comparatively small SS-11 missiles has led some analysts to conclude that the Russians have decided they have a much better missile than either of the others and intend to concentrate their resources on the new system.

No Missiles Installed

Many Administration officials expressed the hope last December that the apparent slowdown in the construction of SS-9 and SS-11 missiles would bring progress in the arms control talks. Evidence of this extensive new activity, which analysts say must have been planned several months ago, is thus viewed as particularly depressing.

Missiles have not yet been installed in the new silos. Since the Russians have been conducting extensive tests of three-part MIRV warheads — MIRV is the acronym for multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle — it is generally assumed that the missile will carry such a payload and probably an improved guidance system.

The evidence that multiple warheads are being put on existing SS-9 missiles also comes from reconnaissance photos. Recent pictures have shown that warhead containers considerably smaller than those in which single SS-9 warheads are transported have been delivered to one or more SS-9 complexes.

American analysts have long said that once the Russians developed what they considered an effective MIRV warhead they would substitute it for single warheads, particularly on the big SS-9, thus multiplying the number of distant targets that could be attacked by each missile.

The United States is engaged in a similar program, although its warheads are considerably smaller. At least 50 Minute-

man-1 missiles have been replaced with Minuteman-3 missiles carrying a MIRV with three warheads of about 160 kilotons each. A kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. The current program calls for conversion of 550 of the force of 1,000 Minutemen.

Danger to Minutemen

A separate program calls for converting 31 of the 41 Polaris-missile submarines to carry the larger Poseidon missile, which has 10 warheads of about 40-kilotons each.

Administration officials have warned that about 420 Soviet SS-9 missiles, if modified to carry three five-megaton warheads each with sufficient accuracy to fall within a quarter of a mile of the target, could destroy 90 per cent of the Minuteman force.

There are now just under 300 SS-9 missiles operational or under construction, Pentagon officials say.

Analysts speculate that the new missile could be either an improved SS-9, with improved guidance and three or more warheads, or a totally new system

with both these features and perhaps better technical reliability. It is believed that the current SS-9's have an accuracy of no better than a half mile, sources say.

While Mr. Laird did not specify the programs for which he might seek extra money in the next budget, other Pentagon officials said the possibilities included speeding up both the deployment of Safeguard missiles to defend Minuteman complexes and of research programs on a new strategic bomber and a new missile submarine.

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New Soviet ICBM Silos Are Put at 40

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

About 40 new silos for Soviet intercontinental missiles have been spotted by U.S. reconnaissance satellites, it was learned yesterday.

It was the photos of these silos on which Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on Wednesday based his statement that the Soviet Union is "involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program." He said it raises questions about the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

The first 10 silos were spotted in late February. Bad weather conditions precluded adequate new photography until recently when the total was up to about 40. The silos are said to be located in both test and operational areas, chiefly in Siberia.

Disclosed by Jackson

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who first disclosed the silo construction on March 7, said in a Boston speech yesterday that "we know this new system involves missiles not less destructive than the 25-megaton SS-9 and it could mean missiles that are far more destructive than the SS-9."

Other sources, however, disputed any such certitude, say-

ing that such a statement could only be an extrapolation from the size of the new silos. Jackson told newsmen in Boston that the silos are empty and that it would probably be 18 months before missiles were emplaced. He also said that there is no direct evidence that the Soviets have flight-tested the new missile.

Jackson also repeated an earlier statement that "the Russians have an ability to deploy at least 60 to 70 of these huge new missiles this year." He told newsmen that these figures were based on the Soviets' past record of SS-9 deployments, not necessarily on the new silo construction rate.

At the Pentagon, spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim refused to add to Laird's Wednesday speech. He described Jackson as "very expert in this field."

Jackson said that continued Soviet silo construction presents a danger of the Soviet-American arms talks in Vienna "collapsing" and could lead to "a catastrophic situation."

But administration sources showed less alarm yesterday. They said that Washington has yet to conclude that the Soviets deliberately developed a new missile system while using the SALT talks as a cover to preclude a corresponding U. S. weapons development. Laird said Wednesday

that unless there is a SALT agreement limiting such offensive weapons, he would have to recommend that the United States begin building new systems of its own.

Talks are Stalled

The SALT talks are currently stalled because the Soviets are proposing an "ABMs only" agreement leaving control of offensive weapons for later. President Nixon has said that there must be "some mix" of both offensive and defensive weapons in any agreement.

The new Soviet missile work is intensifying the American

determination to hold out for inclusion of rival ICBM systems. But Moscow appears to be waiting to see whether pressure in the U. S. Congress will be enough to make Mr. Nixon accept the Soviet proposal. So far there is no sign of that.

Jackson has argued that, in view of the SS-9 threat, the United States must build the Safeguard ABM system to protect its Minuteman missiles. In this, he fully supports Laird and the administration. Laird yesterday had breakfast at the White House with the President, but no information was available on what they discussed.

Soviet ICBM construction of various types has been constantly monitored by the American spy-in-the-sky satellites. No efforts have been made to conceal such construction. It is not known whether this is because of the difficulty in doing so or because Moscow is fully prepared to let Washington know of its growing nuclear power.

Seen as Pressure

Some persons here have speculated that the new silo work represents pressure on Washington to agree to its SALT proposals. Others wonder whether the Soviets have decided to go for nuclear superiority rather than settle for the current rough parity. Still others feel the Soviets ICBMs are no more than a response to the multiple warheads the United States already has emplaced on some Minuteman and on Poseidon missiles aboard Polaris submarines. There has been no Soviet explanation at SALT, officials say.

It is becoming evident that the SALT talks are reaching a crucial point. American officials say the Soviets cannot indefinitely continue to talk at the table, without agreement, while continuing to deploy new ICBMs.

LAIRD SAYS SOVIET RENEWS ABM WORK

Asserts Building at 4 Sites
Resumes—An Improved
Missile Called Possible

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 27—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said today that construction had resumed at one or more of four antimissile sites on the outskirts of Moscow after a break of about three years.

He said it appeared that the Russians might be preparing to deploy an improved interception missile.

Several years ago the Russians were reported to have started work on eight sites circling Moscow at a distance of 50 miles. They apparently completed the four on the west, which contain a total of 64 missiles, but were reported to have stopped work on the four sites to the east in 1968.

Confirms Missile Report

Administration sources said the new construction included an advanced radar installation capable of handling large numbers of attacking warheads simultaneously, plus other "structures" at one or two sites for antiballistic missiles.

In other missile subjects covered in a wide-ranging news conference at the Pentagon this morning, Mr. Laird also did the following things:

He said that a report that the Soviet Union appeared to

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be deploying multiple warheads on some large SS-9 missiles was true.

He warned that if the Soviet Union continued to build up offensive and defensive nuclear weapons and that if an arms-control agreement was not reached, he might be forced to ask Congress to authorize more than the 1,000 Minuteman missiles now in the United States arsenal or to take further measures to defend existing weapons systems.

He insisted that the United States was equipping South Vietnam only to defend itself, not to try to invade North Vietnam.

He reiterated his intention to leave office at the end of his term, but disclaimed any intention of trying to return to the House of Representatives or of running for the Senate.

He showed a reconnaissance photo of a surfaced Soviet missile submarine similar to the United States Polaris submarines, saying it had been taken near Honolulu. Soviet missile submarines are said to be stationed off both the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, much as American submarine patrol within range of targets in the Soviet Union and in China.

Land Missile Discussed

Administration sources said the advanced Soviet land-based interceptor missile was an improved version of the 400-mile missile code-named Golosh believed to be deployed near Moscow now. The new rocket is believed to have greater range and to be able to fly toward an incoming cloud of warheads, metal chaff and other devices and to pick out the warhead and attack it. The United States is working to develop such a capacity in an extended-range antiballistic missile.

The United States system depends upon the long-range Spartans to attack missiles approaching the United States and the Sprint to intercept any that get through on their way to attack Minuteman complexes in the northwest.

To date the Soviet Union is reported to have deployed only the long-range Galosh missile. The Soviet Triad missile radar could handle only one or two targets at a time, American specialists say. The new radar reported under construction near Moscow is believed capable of handling hundreds of warheads, as can United States radars, the sources added.

In a speech last week, Mr. Laird expressed concern about reports of Soviet construction of large missile silos for offensive missiles. Other sources said at the time that construction of at least 40 new silos was under way.

Unclear on Type of Missile

Mr. Laird reasserted today that since no intercontinental missile had been deployed in the new silos, it was unclear whether an improved SS-9 or an entirely new missile would be housed in those silos.

But under questioning, he said that evidence suggested that the Soviet Union had started to install multiple warheads on some existing SS-9 missiles.

There has been a debate in the intelligence community whether Soviet three-part multiple warheads could be accurately guided to separate targets. Mr. Laird said he would not get into that argument, but insisted that the Soviet Union would have multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles in 1972.

Analysts who share this view argue that if the large SS-9 is designed primarily to attack Minuteman silos, the SS-9 would not be effective unless each of the warhead elements could be accurately targeted on a different silo.

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Soviets Expand ABM Net

Laird Cites Construction Near Moscow

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union, after a three-year halt, has resumed construction on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses around Moscow, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird revealed yesterday.

By 1968, the Russians—according to U.S. intelligence estimates—had completed construction on four ABM bases, each with 16 anti-missile missiles designed to shoot down American Minuteman and Polaris ICBMs.

The initial Soviet plan to protect Moscow involved eight such bases.

Now, Laird told reporters yesterday, work on some of the remaining four sites has been resumed. He indicated that the Pentagon expected the new ABM sites to contain both an improved interceptor missile and a new radar to guide it.

For 18 months the Russians have been testing a new ABM missile that can "loiter" or coast in flight at long distances from the capital in order to get an earlier shot at incoming missiles. The Spartan missile for the U.S. Safeguard ABM is being designed with a similar capability.

Laird indicated that the new Russian ABMs were not yet installed, and other Pentagon sources said the new work on the Moscow area sites was first observed several months ago.

The disclosure on the Soviet ABM project marked the second time within a week that Laird has publicly revealed new evidence of Russian nuclear weapon build-ups.

In New York last Wednesday, he said there is fresh evidence that a separate Soviet project—construction of underground ICBM silos for new, large offensive missiles—was moving ahead rapidly.

Laird, in linking the Soviet ABM and ICBM moves, once again raised the prospect that he might have to go to Congress for additional money this year to offset these newest Soviet advances.

He mentioned adding more U.S. Minuteman ICBMs to the force of 1,000 already stored in underground silos as one possible response, as well as other moves. Other Pentagon sources said this could include speeding up installation of the Safeguard ABM around the first two of four Minuteman bases that are to be protected by the system.

Laird also said there was now some evidence that the Soviet Union has begun installing multiple warheads on some of the SS-9 ICBMs. But Laird said he could not state positively that the warheads were of the type that can be directed to separate targets (MIRV) or those that send a packet of three warheads buckshot-style into the same general target area (MRV). He said he preferred to stick to the Pentagon's estimate made last month that the Russians could have the MIRV capability by 1972.

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ABM, From A1

Laird, noting again his concern over the growing Soviet threat and the need to pay more attention to that rather than to Vietnam only, also displayed a Navy aerial photo of a Soviet Polaris-style submarine that had surfaced about 460 miles northeast of Honolulu.

The United States has known Soviet subs of that type have been operating in the Pacific Ocean for some

time, but has never before observed one on the surface.

Yesterday, Laird, contrasted the "continuing momentum" of Soviet weapon projects to what he described as the "near moratorium" that the U.S. strategic arsenal has been in since 1967 when the last Minuteman and Polaris missiles were ordered into service.

The Secretary's remarks in New York and at the Pentagon yesterday reflect increasing pessimism within the Nixon administration over Soviet intentions at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) now going on in Vienna.

Arms control advocates, however, are not so gloomy, pointing out that the United States has been adding MIRV warheads to its Minuteman and Poseidon ICBMs and installing its own ABM system. They see the Soviet moves as not necessarily deceit, but as possibly a Russian attempt to deal from strength at Salt.

The Soviets are standing pat on their proposal at SALT that the two superpowers agree to limit rival ABM networks, and the resumption of construction might also be intended to reinforce that view. The United States is holding out for an agreement that would limit offensive weapons as well as defensive ABMs.

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Soviet Space Shots Indicate Progress On Satellite Hunting, Interception

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Recent Soviet space shots indicate continued progress toward a system for inspecting and possibly destroying American satellites in wartime.

The United States — over the opposition of Air Force leaders — abandoned its satellite inspector system more than a decade ago and now has nothing to compare with the Russian one.

The latest evidence of anti-satellite development comes

from two shots that the Soviet Union labeled Cosmos 400 and 404.

Cosmos 400, the target satellite, was launched from the Soviet spaceport of Plesetsk on March 19. It went around in a nearly circular orbit about 600 miles above the earth, with each circuit taking about 105 minutes.

The hunter satellite, launched from Tyuratam on April 4, went through a series of maneuvers under propul-

sion supplied by the giant SS-9 rocket, the Soviets' ICBM.

The Soviet Union has conducted such space marksmanship tests before in what U.S. intelligence officials believe is part of the development of an anti-satellite system. But this time the test showed more sophistication, according to informed sources, as the hunter satellite stayed in phase with the target for a longer period of time than on previous shots.

See SPACE, A4, Col. 1

SPACE, From A1

Such a capability would give the Soviet Union a longer time to inspect a hostile satellite to determine what it was, for example, to help commanders on the ground to decide on the next step—such as destruction.

Also, the hunter was not blown up in this latest experiment in contrast to earlier ones. Apparently the Soviet Union sent the hunter satellite out of orbit and into the atmosphere, where pieces of it would fall into the ocean.

The basis for this theory is the radar track of the Soviet satellites, which showed one

of them dropping out of orbit instead of exploding into little pieces.

Since the cancellation of the Air Force satellite interceptor project called SAINT, the United States has been relying on a small group of Thor missiles on Johnson Island to handle the Soviet satellite threat. The Thors were installed with nuclear warheads.

Hostile satellites would have to fly within range of the land-based Thors for the United States to intercept them.

The doomsday view of continuing Soviet progress with anti-satellite systems is that they would be used to knock out the American navigation satellites for our missile-carrying submarines.

With the submarine threat thus reduced, goes the theory, Russian Polaris-type submarines could knock out American long-range bombers on the ground.

Also, the Soviet FOBS—a bomb that could be sent against the United States the long way around from Russia to escape detection—could also be used against bomber bases and command centers under the worst-case analysis.

On top of all that weaponry, the doomsday theorists claim that the Soviet SS-9 and other ICBMs could knock out the American Minuteman force and make a first strike on this country look tempting.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has not gone this far in painting the picture of Soviet weapons progress. But it is conceivable this first-strike scenario will be given more emphasis in the days ahead as the Pentagon seeks additional money for new strategic weapons systems of its own.

Those countering the doomsday view insist that a coordinated first strike by Russia or any other power is out of the question and therefore insane to defend against. Therefore, they argue, when the Soviet Union takes up programs like SAINT after the United States itself has discarded them as impractical there is no cause for alarm in the defense establishment.

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Arms Race Surge Is Feared

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

A number of top-level U.S. defense planners believe that unless fundamental decisions on limiting nuclear weaponry are made by this fall in the Kremlin and the White House, another enormously expensive surge in the arms race will be unavoidable.

Despite President Nixon's reiteration at an April 29 press conference that he was "not discouraged" by the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, several high-ranking officials say they sense that time is running out.

As they see it, the critical weapons systems both sides are using as bargaining chips in SALT—the huge Soviet offensive missiles and the U.S. Safeguard missile defense designed to protect Minuteman ICBMs—are developing a momentum of their own that now threatens to outpace the talks.

If a breakthrough is to come, officials believe it will have to be this year. After that, few administration experts expect the President to risk further delay in ordering a speedup on new U.S. weapons—bombers, missile-firing submarines and a still thicker ABM defense around Minuteman—to offset the recently discovered Soviet advances.

New Silos Spotted

In recent months, U.S. reconnaissance satellites have spotted at least 40 new underground silos being dug in the Soviet Union for what could be a new and still larger version of the big SS-9 ICBM. Knowledgeable officials say they expect to find even more holes in coming months as satellite coverage is expanded.

There is also evidence—although it is still ambiguous—that the Soviets may have begun installing multiple warheads on some existing SS-9

Officials concede, however, that those issues are now at least better defined. They add that prospects of finding a way out of the impasse are not entirely gloomy.

U.S. defense planners are now considering a number of potential counterproposals to the latest Soviet offer at SALT.

That proposal, made within the last few weeks at the Vienna conference site, essentially was a renewed bid—in the form of a draft treaty—to get the United States to agree to a limitation on rival ABMs to protect the Moscow and Washington areas only.

The Nixon administration has consistently rejected this kind of agreement unless it was also tied to specific limits on the size and number of offensive missiles that could theoretically be used to wipe out American missiles and bombers in a surprise attack. No such limitations were included in the latest Soviet draft.

Contrary to one published report, high-level officials say the Soviet proposal did not include a five-year limit on the treaty. The draft did suggest that the rival ABMs be limited to roughly 100 interceptor missiles each. That limit was first suggested, however, by the United States last year, when mutual Washington-Moscow ABM limitations were proposed by U.S. negotiators as part of a broader agreement that would have covered ICBMs, too.

No Radar Limits

The new Soviet proposal also fails to put limits on ABM radars, another omission troubling some U.S. defense planners. The radars take much longer to produce than ABM missiles and launchers. Those suspicious of Soviet intentions say that unless the radars are also curbed, the Soviet

cord the Soviets are pressing for.

These officials say that a potential agreement might be worked out if, as part of an ABM limit, the treaty also committed the Soviets to immediate further negotiations on offensive systems as well, with a very strict—and probably short—time limit put on those negotiations.

These officials stress that they are talking about what may be possible in their view. No one is willing to second-guess the President's readiness to depart in any degree from his earlier insistence that any treaty must not be limited to defensive weapons.

Domestic political factors also complicate predictions on the President's course. Two leading Democratic presidential contenders—Sens. Hubert Humphrey (Minn.) and Edmund Muskie (Maine)—have made a political issue over the stalled SALT talks, arguing for an ABM-only agreement.

Three Approaches

Officials say three separate ABM-only possibilities are getting fresh study by U.S. defense planners:

- A "zero-ABM" agreement, which would mean none on either side. With no ABMs, a country springing a surprise attack could still be devastated in return, even if only a small fraction of the enemy's missiles survived.

Administration sources say this approach has been pushed hard by U.S. negotiators in the past, although little public attention has focused on it.

- An agreement that would essentially allow the United States and Soviet Union to finish the limited ABMs both are

already building, one around Moscow and the other around the four Minuteman bases in this country.

- The Soviet proposal for protecting the two capitals. It is given virtually no chance to succeed by administration sources unless linked directly to an agreement on offensive weapons.

Planners say that even in the first two cases, the United States probably would insist on a time-limited agreement to continue talking about a halt in ICBMs.

Whether any of these proposals actually emerge from the White House, or whether the Soviets will budge at all from their current position, remains to be seen. Some Kremlin watchers also fear that the Soviet negotiators may not be able to respond to a new U.S. offer without another long recess to gather instructions. And during that time, the weapons would continue accumulating.